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THE FULL STRATEGY MINORITY GAME
GABRIEL ACOSTA, INE´S CARIDI, SEBASTIA´N GUALA, AND JAVIER MARENCO
Abstract. The Full Strategy Minority Game (FSMG) is an instance of the Minority Game
(MG) which includes a single copy of every potential agent. In this work, we explicitly solve the
FSMG thanks to certain symmetries of this game. Furthermore, by considering the MG as a
statistical sample of the FSMG, we compute approximated values of the key variable σ2/N in
the symmetric phase for different versions of theMG. As another application we prove that our
results can be easily modified in order to handle certain kind of initial biased strategies scores,
in particular when the bias is introduced at the agents’ level. We also show that the FSMG
verifies a strict period two dynamics (i.e., period two dynamics satisfied with probability 1)
giving, to the best of our knowledge, the first example of an instance of the MG for which this
feature can be analytically proved. Thanks to this property, it is possible to compute in a simple
way the probability that a general instance of the MG breaks the period two dynamics for the
first time in a given simulation.
1. Introduction
The Minority Game (MG) was introduced in 1997 by Challet and Zhang [1] in an attempt
to catch essential characteristics of a competitive population in which an individual achieves
the best result when she manages to be in the minority group. In the MG, there are N agents
(usually odd), that at each step of the game must choose 0 or 1. Let N0(t) (resp. N1(t)) be
the number of agents choosing 0 (resp. 1) at the step t (note that N0(t) + N1(t) = N). The
winners are those who happen to be in the minority group (i.e., the minimum between N0(t)
and N1(t)). The only information available for the agents is the system state µ ∈ {0, 1}m,
that is updated after each step of the game. The parameter m is an input of the game and
defines the information-processing capacity of the agents. In the classical version of the MG,
µ is defined to be an endogenous variable determined from the sequence of minority sides in
the last m steps, although other kinds of updating rules can be found in the literature [2, 3].
In early works, µ was also called history and m the agents’ memory. Therefore, the number of
possible states is H = 2m. Agents play using the so-called strategies. A strategy is a function
that assigns a prediction (0 or 1) for each of the possible states. In this way, there are L = 2H
different strategies. Each agent has s strategies at her disposal (we use s = 2 in this work),
randomly chosen with replacement from the complete set of strategies at the beginning of the
game (note that it is possible for an agent to have two identical strategies, and for two agents to
have the same pair of strategies). At every step of the game, each of the strategies that correctly
predicted the winning side is awarded a virtual point, regardless of use in that step. At each
step, each agent plays what her best-performing strategy (in terms of virtual points) predicts.
If the two strategies have the same number of virtual points, the agent randomly chooses one of
them.
Given N agents, an instance of the MG is a particular assignment of strategies to the agents.
We define a configuration E of the game to be a pair E = {M, I}, where M = {µ˜1, µ˜2, ...} is a
sequence of states (generated by any updating rule) and I is an instance of the MG.
Key words and phrases. minority game, period two dynamics, updating rule .
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The observable z = < (N1 − N/2)2/N >E is the most studied and instructive variable [4]
in the MG. It measures the population’s waste of resources by averaging on time and over
different configurations E , the quadratic deviation of the number of agents that chose a fixed
side (for example N1) from N/2. The notation σ
2/N = z is usual in the literature. One of the
reasons why theMG has attracted so much attention is that for certain values of the parameters
m, N , and s, the variable z is smaller than that obatined for a game in which each of the N
agents randomly chooses between the two sides. In the latter, N1(t) corresponds to a binomial
random variable Bi(N, 1/2), hence z = σ2/N = 1/4. It is interesting to note that z reflects
that the population as a whole achieves more resources, but does not reveal how that wealth
is distributed among the agents. Ho et al. adequatedly redefined a Gini index for the MG [5]
which showed that whenever z takes its minimum value, the inequality among the agents is
maximized.
For α = H/N = 2m/N , it was proposed [4, 6] that the curve given by z against α is indepen-
dent of N (i.e., z could be regarded as a function of the parameter α) although longer simulations
of the MG showed that the curve does depend on N within the range 0.01 . α . 0.2, in the
sense that the variable z increases as N increases [7]. However, such invariance does arise in the
MGrand introduced by Cavagna [2], where a different updating rule is used: the system state µ
is randomly chosen (with uniform distribution) at each game step. In [3], the authors propose
a periodic updating rule of period H, which we call MGper throughout this work. Like in the
MG, z increases with N for the MGper (in the curve given by z against α) for the same range
of α.
In the region given by α 1, crowd effects arise at some game steps. This behavior is related
to a dynamics known as Period Two Dynamics (PTD), which was observed for the first time
by Savit et al. [8]. To understand this dynamics, that plays an important role in the rest of
the article, for each game step t we define the parity array PtE to be an array of categorical
variables recording the parity (odd or even) of the number of appearences of each state in the
first t−1 game steps. More precisely, we have PtE ∈ {O,E}H and if we identify any state µ with
the integer number given by the binary expansion of µ plus one (so that µ can be thought as
an integer ranging from 1 to H), we have that PtE (µ) = O (resp. E) if µ has appeared an odd
(resp. even) number of times in the first t−1 steps of the game. We assume P1E = (E,E, · · · , E),
as at the beginning of the game any state has appeared zero times, hence an even number of
times. For a simple example let us consider that {0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, · · · } is the sequence of minority
sides obtained in a game with m = 2. Then if the standard updating rule is used, µ˜1 = 00,
µ˜2 = 01, µ˜3 = 10, etc., and at time step t = 6, the states µ1 = 00, µ2 = 01, µ3 = 10 and µ4 = 11
have appeared 1, 3, 2 and 0 times respectively, hence P7E = (O,O,E,E). We will drop t when
referring to a generic time step, using PE(µ) instead.
The PTD can be summarized in the following way: if at some time step, for some state µ
we have PE(µ) = O, then in the next (and hence even) appearance of µ, the outcome of the
game is very likely to be the opposite to that obtained in the previous appearance of µ. Broadly
speaking, this dynamics is due to the fact that on even appearances of µ crowds of agents will
move together to the side rewarded in the previous odd appearance. When crowds emerge in the
game, their contribution to z is very important. Furthermore, crowd effects are the reason why
z is a large number in this region, showing that fewer resources are allocated to the population
as a whole.
In a little more than a decade, there have been many attempts from different backgrounds
to give a formal framework to the game, and to analytically reproduce the results observed
in computer simulations [9]. Marsili et al. proposed an analytical approach by resorting to
sophisticated tools from statistical physics, such as non-equilibrium stochastic dynamics [10] and
the replica method [11]; Heimel et al. proposed an analytical approach based on the generating
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functional analysis [12]. A geometric approach is based on the use of the Reduced Strategy Space
defined as the subset of independent strategies plus the corresponding totally anticorrelated
strategies [13, 14]. Based on this approach, Johnson et al. derived approximate expressions for
the attendance fluctuations [15, 16]. In [17] a mean field approach to the MG is presented and
the standard deviation of the key variable N1 − N0 is computed by introducing a simplified
framework. The key idea in [17] consists in defining a particular instance of the game so that,
for any value of m, all possible strategies and all possible agents (each one represented by a
possible pair of strategies in the case s = 2) take part in the game. We call this particular
instance the Full Strategy Minority Game (FSMG). For s = 2, the number of potential agents
is N = (L2) + L, where the first term represents all agents with two different strategies, and
the second term represents the number of agents whose two strategies are identical. Thus, the
number of agents of the FSMG is a function of m, N = N (m). Certain symmetries which
appear only partially in the MG can be fully exploited in the FSMG, and this approach leads
to interesting theoretical results in the PTD region.
In this paper, we show that the calculations given in [17] can be highly simplified and easily
applied to other variants of the MG, as the above-mentioned MGrand and MGper. By taking
advantage of its inherent symmetries, we analytically solve the FSMG. In particular, we show
the role of the number of states in odd occurrences in the calculation of the variable z arriving
to similar conclusions as that given in [18] by means of a different approach. What is more, our
calculations also apply to certain kinds of initial biased scores if the bias is introduced at the
agents’ level, i.e. given a positive uo, any agent decides to assign uo virtual points ”a priori”
to any of their strategies with probability pb. On the other hand we define the Strict Period
Two Dynamics (SPTD) as a PTD with probability 1, and show that SPTD is the characteristic
dynamics of the FSMG. Moreover, by considering the MG as a statistical sample of size N
of the FSMG, we are able to predict the validity region of PTD for the MG in a precise way.
This theoretical result agrees fairly well with computer simulations.
2. The Full Strategy Minority Game
2.1. Symmetry of the FSMG. Let H = 2m, L = 2H and N = (L2) + L be the number of
different states, different strategies and different potential agents for a MG with parameter m.
If we take an arbitrary number N of agents it is clear that, in randomly generated instances
I of the MG, the following may happen: (1) some potential agent may not participate in the
game or (2) a multiple copy of the same agent may participate in the game. In the Full Strategy
Minority Game both cases are excluded: by construction the number of agents in the FSMG
is set to N and a single copy of every potential agent is allowed. SH and SL (also known as
the Full Strategy Space) denote the set of states and strategies respectively. Throughout this
article, the symbol ] stands for the cardinality of a set, hence we have ]SH = H, and ]SL = L.
For a given state µ ∈ SH, the subset of strategies in SL that predict a certain outcome o˜ for the
state µ is denoted by SL,µ→o˜. For an arbitrary outcome o˜ ∈ {0, 1} we will denote the opposite
side by ∼ o˜. It is clear that SL,µ→o˜ ∪ SL,µ→∼o˜ = SL, and that ]SL,µ→o˜ = ]SL,µ→∼o˜ = L/2.
This means that for each state µ, the number of strategies predicting o˜ and the number of
strategies predicting ∼ o˜ coincide. This symmetry together with the assumption of the SPTD
allow us to make a remarkable analytic simplification of the game. Indeed, let us consider an
arbitrary configuration E of the FSMG, and its state sequence M (note that there exists only
one instance I for each m in the FSMG). Suppose that at step s a certain state µ˜s = µ occurs
for the first (and hence odd) time, and call o˜ the winning side after the voting round s. In that
case the parity array verifies Ps+1(µ) = O (since P l(µ) = E if l ≤ s) and strategies belonging to
the set SL,µ→o˜ are rewarded with a virtual point. Suppose now that at the time step s′, s′ > s,
µ occurs for the second time (i.e., µ˜s
′
= µ), then the SPTD implies that the winning side after
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the voting round s′ will be ∼ o˜, and thus exactly the other half of the strategies (SL,µ→∼o˜) will
correctly predict the minority side. Therefore, if we remove the point previously assigned to
the set of strategies SL,µ→o˜ instead of adding a new point to strategies belonging to SL,µ→∼o˜,
the dynamics of the game will remain unchanged. Taking into account this rule, it is clear that
the number of virtual points accumulated for any strategy, at any time step, ranges from 0 to
H. In equation (15) we show that the FSMG necessarily verifies the SPTD, and hence the
SPTD assumption can be removed in the previous argument. As far as we know this is the first
example in the literature of a game enjoying this property.
In the sequel we denote with SL,l the set of strategies with l virtual points, and with SL,µ→o˜,l
(resp. SL,µ→∼o˜,l) the set of strategies with l virtual points that predict o˜ (resp. ∼ o˜) for µ.
2.2. Strategies of the FSMG. Given a parity array PE at an arbitrary time step, we define ne
(resp. no) as the number of even (resp. odd) symbols stored in PE , we have that 0 ≤ ne, no ≤ H
and no = H − ne. Below, we show that the number ]SL,l of strategies with exactly l virtual
points depends only on PE , and for a given state µ the values of ]SL,µ→o˜,l and ]SL,µ→∼o˜,l depend
only on PE and the parity of µ.
If ne = H, then no strategies can have virtual points due to the fact that only after odd
appearances of states the strategies may get a point, i.e., ]SL,0 = ]SL = L, and ]SL,i = 0 for
1 ≤ i ≤ H. On the other hand, if ne = H − 1 then there is only one state, say µ1, in an odd
occurrence. In this case, strategies can have virtual points due to this state only. But now,
regardless of the outcome o˜ (i.e., o˜ = 0 or o˜ = 1) after this odd ocurrence of µ1, strategies
belonging to SL,µ1→o˜ will have exactly one virtual point, and those in the complement SL,µ1→∼o˜
will have exactly 0 points, hence ]SL,1 = ]SL,0 = L/2, and ]SL,i = 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ H. In the
general case for parity numbers no and ne we observe that the maximum number of virtual points
for a given strategy is bounded by no, since even ocurrences do not add any points.
Let 0 ≤ l ≤ no, and let µk1 , · · · , µkno be the states recording odd numbers of ocurrences, and
o˜1, o˜2, · · · , o˜no be the outcomes after the last ocurrence of each µki . The number ]SL,l can be
easily computed by noting that a strategy has exactly l points if it has succesfully predicted the
outcome (i.e., it has won a virtual point) l times out of the no time steps corresponding to the
last occurrences of the odd states, and has unsuccesfully predicted the outcome in the remaining
no − l time steps. For instance, if a strategy belongs to
Fµk1 ,··· ,µkl = SL,µk1→o˜1 ∩ SL,µk2→o˜2 · · · ∩ SL,µkl→o˜l ,
then it has succesfully predicted the outcome at least l times. If in addition it belongs to
F∼µkl+1 ,··· ,∼µkno = SL,µknl+1→∼o˜nl+1 · · · ∩ SL,µkno→∼o˜no
then it has unsuccesfully predicted the outcome at least no−l times. So, the strategies belonging
to
Fµk1 ,··· ,µkl ,∼µkl+1 ,··· ,∼µkno = Fµk1 ,··· ,µkl ∩ F∼µkl+1 ,··· ,∼µkno
have exactly l points. We easily find that
]Fµk1 ,··· ,µkl ,∼µkl+1 ,··· ,∼µkno = L/2
no (1)
since only L/2 strategies belong to SL,µk1→o˜1 and from those strategies only half succesfully
predict the outcome o˜2 for the state µk2 , i.e., ](SL,µk1→o˜1 ∩ SL,µk2→o˜2) = L/22, and so on until
we obtain the number L/2l of strategies that have succesfully predicted o˜1, · · · , o˜l. But from this
set exactly half fails to predict o˜l+1 (i.e., half of them predict ∼ o˜l+1) and so on. In this way we
finally arrive to (1). Since there are
(no
l
)
ways of choosing l states from the set {µk1 , · · · , µkno}
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of states on some odd occurrence, we get
]SL,l =
(
no
l
)
L/2no . (2)
An important remark is the following: for a given state µ and a given parity array P, the set
SL,l can be decomposed in two sets as SL,l = SL,µ→o˜,l ∪ SL,µ→∼o˜,l. Whether or not these sets
have the same cardinality depends on the parity of the state µ. Indeed, if µ is on an even state
(i.e., P(µ) = E), we have
]SL,µ→o˜,l = ]SL,µ→∼o˜,l = ]SL,l/2 =
(
no
l
)
L/2no+1 (3)
since we can apply the same argument used to get (2) to the set SL,µ→o˜ (and SL,µ→∼o˜). Indeed,
the set SL,µ→o˜ has cardinality L/2 and the same symmetry properties than SL,l (due to the fact
that P(µ) = E). The situation is different if we take a state µ with P(µ) = O, in fact, the
cardinality of the sets SL,µ→o˜,l, SL,µ→∼o˜,l cannot be equal. Indeed, if after the last appearance
of µ the outcome of the game was o˜, then the strategies belonging to SL,µ→o˜ have at least one
virtual point, so those strategies with l points have successfully predicted the outcome exactly
l− 1 times out of the no − 1 time steps corresponding to the remaining states recording an odd
ocurrence, i.e.,
]SL,µ→o˜,l =
(
no − 1
l − 1
)
L/2no (4)
and those belonging to SL,µ→∼o˜,l have successfuly predicted the outcome exactly l times out of
the no − 1 time steps corresponding to all the states recording an odd ocurrence, i.e.,
]SL,µ→∼o˜,l =
(
no − 1
l
)
L/2no . (5)
We again have SL,µ→o˜,l + SL,µ→∼o˜,l = SL,l, which holds since
(no−1
l−1
)
+
(no−1
l
)
=
(no
l
)
.
2.3. Agents and dynamics of the FSMG. Let us focus on theN agents of the FSMG. With
No˜ and N∼o˜ we denote the number of agents choosing the option o˜ and the opposite option ∼ o˜,
respectively. When needed, we explicitly write N to˜ and N t∼o˜ to denote the dependence of these
variables on the time step t.
For a given time step t and a parity array PtE , we know from the previous section the distri-
bution of virtual points for strategies (2). Recall that we have nte and n
t
o states on even and odd
occurrences respectively for a given PtE . We drop t from no and ne for the sake of simplicity.
Now we can predict the polls result if agents of the FSMG are required to process a certain state
µp (called the present state) given by an arbitrary updating rule. To this end, we call undecided
agents to the agents that have both strategies equally rewarded and predict opposite sides for µp,
i.e., one strategy belongs to SL,µp→o˜,l and the other to SL,µp→∼o˜,l , for certain l. The number of
undecided agents is denoted by Nu. On the other hand, decided agents are the remaining ones,
so that Nd = N − Nu. We also introduce the number of decided and undecided agents who
choose the option o˜ to be Ndo˜ and Nuo˜, respectively. Clearly, we have
No˜ = Ndo˜ +Nuo˜ and N∼o˜ = Nd∼o˜ +Nu∼o˜.
In the following, we will show that Nu, Ndo˜ and Nd∼o˜ can be explicitly calculated for a given
state µp. The value Nu can be obtained by noticing that undecided agents have, for each l, one
strategy from SL,µp→o˜,l and the other one from SL,µp→∼o˜,l. The total number of agents in this
situation is
Nu =
no∑
l=0
]SL,µp→o˜,l]SL,µp→∼o˜,l. (6)
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The sum ranges over all possible virtual points that strategies may have for the given parity
array PtE . On the other hand, decided agents that choose o˜ for the present state have either two
strategies from SL,µp→o˜ (first and second terms in equation (7)) or one strategy from SL,µp→o˜,l
and the other one from SL,µp→∼o˜,j, with l > j (last term in (7)):
Ndo˜ =
(
]SL,µp→o˜
2
)
+ ]SL,µp→o˜ +
no∑
l=1
]SL,µp→o˜,l

 l−1∑
j=0
]SL,µp→∼o˜,j

 . (7)
Let us first assume that PtE(µp) = E, i.e., the present state µp has appeared an even number
of times up to time step t − 1. Suppose that now agents are required to process the state µp
(i.e., µp = µ˜
t), so this state is in an odd appearance. Suppose now that o˜ was the outcome of
the game after the last (and hence even) appearance of µp. From (3), (7) and (6) it is easy to
check that Ndo˜ = Nd∼o˜ , and that
Nu = L2/22no+2
no∑
l=0
(
no
l
)2
. (8)
In short, if agents process a state in an odd appearance, then we have
Ndo˜ −Nd∼o˜ = 0, Nu = L2/22no+2
(
2no
no
)
. (9)
Let us assume now that PtE (µp) = O (i.e., the present state is in an even appearance). In this
case, we use (4) and (5) to obtain Nu, Ndo˜ , and Nd∼o˜:
Nu = L2/22no
no−1∑
l=1
(
no − 1
l − 1
)(
no − 1
l
)
= L2/22no
(
2(no − 1)
no
)
, (10)
that is obtained by using the Vandermonde’s identity.
Ndo˜ =
(L/2
2
)
+ L/2 + L2/22no

 no∑
l=1
(
no − 1
l − 1
) l−1∑
j=0
(
no − 1
j
)

 , (11)
Nd∼o˜ =
(L/2
2
)
+ L/2 + L2/22no

no−1∑
l=1
(
no − 1
l
) l−1∑
j=1
(
no − 1
j − 1
)

 . (12)
In short, if agents process a state in an even appearance, then
Ndo˜ −Nd∼o˜ = L2/22no
(
2no − 1
no
)
,
Nu = L2/22no
(
2(no − 1)
no
)
. (13)
These equations lead to the following remarkable result
Ndo˜ −Nd∼o˜ −Nu = L2/22no
(
2(no − 1)
no − 1
)
> 0, (14)
that says that FSMG verifies necessarily the SPTD when the present state is in an even occur-
rence. Indeed, (14) was obtained under the assumption that o˜ was the outcome of the game
after the previous appearance of µp and shows that
Ndo˜ −Nd∼o˜ > Nu (15)
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at the occurrence of the present state. Then, no matter what undecided agents do, the minority
side will be ∼ o˜ after the agents have processed the new appearance of µp.
One may think that since SPTD was an assumption, then (15) is not surprising. However, we
can now remove such an assumption. In fact, let us consider a configuration E of the FSMG,
and its sequence of states M = {µ˜1, µ˜2, · · · }. Since P1E = (E,E, · · · , E), in time step 1 agents
process µ1, and we have P1E(µ1) = E. So we are on an odd appearance of µ1 and we easily see
that our previous arguments lead us to (9). The first repeated state will occur in at most H
steps (the size of the state space), until then all states will occur in an odd number of times
and virtual points of strategies are bounded by H, so we can still apply our arguments leading
once more to (9). Since the first time that a state needs to be processed in an even occurrence
will take place during the first H + 1 steps, then the strategies’ virtual points range from 0 to
H. Due to this fact, the previous arguments also apply for the first even appearance of a state,
hence (15) holds and enforces the SPTD, allowing us to apply the modified points assignment
rule for the first time. By repeating the argument for the second, third, etc. even appearances
of states we can conclude the validity of the SPTD in general.
3. From the FSMG to the MG
3.1. Distribution of the agents’ choices. An instance I of the MG is a (random) sample
of size N from the N agents of the FSMG. Consider an experiment consisting in randomly
extracting (with reposition) a sample of size N from a box containing N agents of three different
types, namely Ndo˜ of type 1, Nd∼o˜ of type 2 and Nu of type 3. Suppose that after extracting
the sample, we obtain Ndo˜ agents of type 1, Nd∼o˜ agents of type 2, and Nu agents of type 3, so
that
Ndo˜ +Nd∼o˜ +Nu = N. (16)
In this setting, (Ndo˜ , Nd∼o˜ , Nu) is a random variable with a multinomial probability distribution.
Therefore, the probability of obtaining Ndo˜ , Nd∼o˜ and Nu is:
P (x1 = Ndo˜ , x2 = Nd∼o˜ , x3 = Nu) =
N !
(Ndo˜)! (Nd∼o˜)! (Nu)!
p
Ndo˜
1 p
Nd∼o˜
2 p
Nu
3 , (17)
where
p1 =
Ndo˜
N , p2 =
Nd∼o˜
N , p3 =
Nu
N . (18)
Our aim is to characterize the variable No˜ (i.e., the number of agents who choose side o˜).
To this end, consider a second experiment: once a sample with Ndo˜ , Nd∼o˜ and Nu agents of
each type is obtained, we need to know the distribution of Nuo˜ , i.e., the number of undecided
agents choosing o˜. Since undecided agents randomly pick among their strategies, a reasonable
assumption is that Nuo˜ ∼ Bi(Nu, 1/2). From No˜ = Ndo˜ +Nuo˜ one can easily show that
No˜ ∼ Bi(N, p1 + p3/2)
or, using that p1 + p2 + p3 = 1,
No˜ ∼ Bi(N, 1/2 + (p1 − p2)/2). (19)
Equation (19) will be useful in the following sections.
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3.2. Analytic calculations for different updating rules. For a fixed side o˜, the expected
value
σ2 = < (No˜ −N/2)2 > (20)
over every possible configuration E measures the waste of the population’s resources. Our
previous calculations allow us to compute the expected values on odd σ2o = < (No˜ −N/2)2 >o
and even σ2e = < (No˜ −N/2)2 >e occurrences of the present state µp, in order to find a closed
expression for (20).
Given a random variable y ∼ Bi(N, p) it is known that V ar(y) = Np(1−p), and < y >= Np,
hence from (19) we have that
V ar(No˜) = N/4(1 − (p1 − p2)2) = N/4
(
1−
(Ndo˜ −Nd∼o˜
N
)2)
,
< No˜ >= N/2(1 + (p1 − p2)) = N/2
(
1 +
(Ndo˜ −Nd∼o˜
N
))
. (21)
where the last identity follows from (18). By (9) and (13), we have that Ndo˜ − Nd∼o˜ only
depends on no for both odd and even appearances of µp. Therefore, if for a given updating rule
the probability distribution of the random variable no is known, then (20) can be computed.
Clearly, we have
σ2 = V ar(No˜ −N/2) + (< No˜ > −N/2)2 = V ar(No˜) + (< No˜ > −N/2)2. (22)
By replacing (21) in (22) we get
σ2 = N/4
(
1 + (N − 1)
(Ndo˜ −Nd∼o˜
N
)2)
. (23)
We can use this equation on odd (σ2o) and even (σ
2
e) occurrences. In odd occurrences of the
present state µp equation (9) yields Ndo˜ −Nd∼o˜ = 0 and hence (23) gives
σ2o = N/4 (24)
regardless the updating rule, as observed when the variable σ2o/N is computed in numerical
simulations. On even occurrences of µp –when the crowd effect arises– from (23) and (13) we
obtain
σ2e,no = N/4

1 + (N − 1)
(
L2/22no(2no−1no )
N
)2
for a parity array with no states in odd ocurrences. Using that
L2
N
= 2
1+L−1
, L = 2H and(2no−1
no
)
=
(2no
no
)
/2, we can write
σ2e,no = N/4
(
1 +
N − 1
(1 + 2−H)2
(
1/22no
(
2no
no
))2)
. (25)
The role of the updating rule becomes relevant in the “typical” numbers no that appear when
agents are processing a state µp in an even occurrence. To be more precise, if p(no|µp ≡ e)
stands for the probability of finding no states in odd occurrence given that µp is on an even
occurrence then we have
σ2e =
∑
no
p(no|µp ≡ e)σ2e,no . (26)
We apply the obtained results to different kinds of updating rules. Our two first examples
are based on the exogenous updating rules found in MGrand [2] and MGper [3]. In the end
of the subsection we address the standard MG. Since the FSMG verifies the SPTD and our
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calculations rely on the FSMG, we expect to find good results only in the region of validity of
the PTD.
In the MGrand, the present state µp is chosen at random (uniformly) from the whole set of
states SH. In this case one can easily get
p(no|µp ≡ e)MGrand = 1/2H−1
(H− 1
no − 1
)
. (27)
Indeed, if µp is in an even appearance, then its parity is recorded as odd in P, i.e., P(µp) = O,
hence from the H− 1 remaining states µ we need to find the probability that exactly no − 1 of
them verify P(µ) = O. Since each state is in odd occurrence with probability 1/2, (27) follows.
Now, we are ready to find an approximate value of σ2MGrand = 1/2σ
2
o + 1/2σ
2
e . From (24), (25),
(26), and (27), we obtain
σ2MGrand/N = 1/4 +
N − 1
8(1 + 2−H)22H−1
H∑
n0=1
(
1/22no
(
2no
no
))2(H− 1
no − 1
)
. (28)
It is not clear whether or not (28) depends only on α = 2m/N = H/N . However, it can be
approximated by (29), which only depends on α (i.e., it follows the scaling relation σ2MGrand/N ∼
f(α), [7]). Indeed, due to the fact that in theMGrand approximately half of states will be in odd
occurrences, we can only take one “typical” value no = H/2 in (25), neglecting the contribution
of any other σ2e,no to σ
2
e in (26). By doing this we obtain the following approximation:
σ2MGrand/N ∼ 1/4 +
(
1
2H(1 + 1
2H
)
( H
H/2
))2
(N − 1)/8.
Taking into account that N  1, 2H = 22m  1 (so that N−1 ∼ N , 1+ 1
2H
∼ 1) , and using the
well known approximation (which can be obtained straightforwardly from Stirling’s formula),
1
2H
(
H
H/2
) ∼√ 2Hpi we get
σ2MGrand/N ∼ 1/4 +
N
4Hpi . (29)
In Figure 1 we show the analytical result given by (28), the approximated expression (29), and
the numerical results for the MGrand with N = 4001.
0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1
α
0.1
1
10
100
σ
 2
/N
 ra
n
d
Figure 1. The straight line shows σ2/N as a function of α for the MGrand for
different values of m (from 2 to 14) and N = 4001. For each value of N and m,
100 runs have been performed, each one of T = 100000 time steps discarding the
first 50000 steps. Empty circles show the analytical result (28), and star-shaped
symbols show the approximated invariant (i.e., depending only on α) expression
(29).
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Our next aim is to apply our calculations to the MGper introduced in [3]. In this case the
updating rule follows a periodic pattern of period H that runs over all the states. In fact, with
our convention that identifies any state µ with its binary expansion plus one, the updating rule
proposed in [3] follows the natural order 1 → 2 → 3 · · · modulo H. In this case we have again
σ2MGper = 1/2σ
2
o + 1/2σ
2
e . On the other hand we clearly get
p(no|µp ≡ e)MGper = 1/H (30)
and then, from (30) together with (24), (25), and (26) we find
σ2MGper/N = 1/4 +
(N − 1)
8H(1 + 2−H)2
H∑
no=1
(
1
22no
(
2no
no
))2
. (31)
In Figure 2 we show the agreement between (31) and numerical experiments for the MGper with
N = 4001. In much the same way as for the MGrand, this expression can be highly simplified.
Indeed, taking into account that N  1, 2H = 22m  1, and using again that 1
22no
(2no
no
) ∼√ 1nopi
, we get
σ2MGper/N ∼ 1/4 +
N
∑H
no=1
1/no
8Hpi
that can be simplified once more
σ2MGper/N ∼ 1/4 +
N
8Hpi (logH + γ), (32)
by using that limM→∞
∑
1≤i≤M 1/i − log(M)→ γ, where γ = 0.57 . . . is the constant of Euler-
Mascheroni. Equation (32) is essentially the same obtained in [18] by means of a different
approach.
0.0001 0.01 1 100
α
0.1
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100
σ
 2
/N
 pe
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Figure 2. On the left, σ2/N as a function of α for theMGper for different values
of m (in the range from 2 to 14) and N =: + symbols for N = 501; × N = 1001;
H N = 2001; N N = 4001. For each value of N and m we perform 100 runs,
each one of T = 100000 time steps discarding the first 50000 steps. On the right,
the full line is the MGper with N = 4001, empty circles are given by (31), and
J show the approximated expression (32).
Finally, we turn our attention to the standard MG. As before, the key tool is equation (26),
for which we need to know p(no|µp ≡ e)MG. We obtain this probability as follows. The updating
rule in the standard MG consists in defining the present state as the last m outcomes of the
game, in this way any chain of correlative states given by the updating rule can be seen as a
walk on the De Bruijn diagram corresponding to each m [19] (Figure 3 shows the diagram of
order 2).
Note that each node in the De Bruijn diagram has two incoming links and two outgoing links.
We performed numerical random walks obeying the SPTD on the De Bruijn diagram, i.e., in
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Figure 3. De Bruijn diagram of order 2. All 4 possible µ states are represented:
00, 01, 10 and 11. Links represent the possible sequences among these states
under the rules of theMG. For example, after the state 00 there are two possible
states which can follow: 01 and 00, and there are two possible preceding states:
10 and 00.
odd occurrences of each state we choose at random one from the two available states allowed by
the diagram, and on even occurrences we choose the state opposite to the one selected in the
previous odd appearance. We recorded at each time the value of no and after a simulation of
50 different walks of 500000 steps, we obtained the approximated probability distribution of the
variable no, that can be seen in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Histograms of probability distribution p(no|µp ≡ e)MG (line) and
p(no|µp ≡ e)MGrand (dash) with parameters m = 2, m = 3, m = 5 and m = 8.
These results were obtained by simulating the possible sequence of states under
two assumptions: the sequence of states satisfies the rule of the MG (i.e., is a
walk in the De Bruijn diagram), and SPTD is valid in the even occurrence of each
state. The MGrand is displayed for illustrative purposes, since it is analytically
given by (27).
Using the obtained p(no|µp ≡ e)MG, we computed σ2MG by means of (24), (25) and (26).
Figure 5 shows the analytical and numerical results.
The fact that the histograms given in Figure 4 agree for m = 2 is particularly interesting.
This is consistent with numerical simulations in which σ2MG ∼ σ2MGrand for m = 2 and N = 4001
(see Figure 6). For m = 3, the histograms corresponding to MG and MGrand slightly differ but
still are very similar, and a χ2 statistical test cannot reject the null hypothesis H0: “the values
obtained from MG and MGrand are mutually consistent (i.e., correspond to variables with the
same mean value)”.
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Figure 5. Left: σ2/N as a function of α in the MG for different values of m
(in the range from 2 to 14) and N . The dash line shows the case N = 501; ×
N = 1001; the full line shows N = 2001; N N = 4001. For each value of N and
m we performed 100 runs, each one of T = 100000 time steps discarding the first
50000 steps. Right: Numerical MG (the full line), and analytical result (◦) for
N = 4001.
3.3. Biased Initial Scores. Our previous calculations were developed on the assumption that
the strategies have zero virtual points at the beginning of the game. As another application of
the FSMG, we consider the case in which an initial bias is introduced to the strategies scores.
The first possibility could be the following (see Ref [21]): take a given uo > 0 and randomly
assign uo (instead of zero) virtual points to certain strategies belonging to the whole set of
strategies of the FSMG. Following this idea, one is tempted to compute a variant of (2) taking
into account such a bias. Regretfully, one can readily discover that the original symmetry of
the FSMG has been broken, and it is not clear how to obtain an analogous of (2). However, a
second possibility can be managed. Suppose that the bias is introduced at the agents’ level, i.e.
any agent randomly chooses, with a bias probability pb, to assign ”a priori” uo virtual points
to each one of their strategies. This way of assigning initial scores differs from that studied in
[9, 12, 10], where a uniform initial bias (called y0 or q(0) in those works) is applied to each agent.
It is important to notice that, in our approach at most a fraction 2pb(1 − pb) (in average) of
agents have different initial scores (in fact a difference of uo points) between their strategies.
For the sake of simplicity, we fix the bias probability pb = 1/2 although we explain below how
to handle more general values (in fact, rational values of pb). Let us introduce an ”enlarged” set
of strategies consisting in two copies S1L,S2L of the original set of strategies SL of the FSMG. In
S1L, all the strategies have 0 virtual points and uo in S2L. Now, the extended FSMGE consists in
a single copy of any possible agent obtained from the enlarged set S1,2L = S1L∪S2L. Following our
previous ideas, the described biased MG can be thought as a statistical sample of the FSMGE .
The number of agents of the FSMGE is now NE = (2L2 ) + 2L. The important fact in this
scenario is that the symmetry still holds inside each SiL, and thanks to this one can replicate
our previous arguments obtaining the analogous of (2)
]S1,2L,l = ]S1L,l + ]S2L,l =
(
no
l
)
L/2no +
(
no
l − uo
)
L/2no . (33)
where l ranges now from 0 to H+ uo (notice that the combinatorial number
(
a
b
)
is zero if b > a
or b < 0). Therefore, analogous for (4) and (5) can be computed and hence the same thing can
be done with (7). By doing this, one can get for the enlarged sets,
NEdo˜ −NEd∼o˜ = L2/22no
(
2
(
2no − 1
no − 1
)
+
(
2no − 1
no − 1 + uo
)
+
(
2no − 1
no − 1− uo
))
(34)
NEu = L2/22no
(
2
(
2(no − 1)
no
)
+
(
2(no − 1)
no − uo
)
+
(
2(no − 1)
no + uo
))
.
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Figure 6. The main figure shows σ2rand/N = x1 (circles), σ
2
per/N = x2 (trian-
gles) and σ2MG/N = x3 (diamonds) for games with N = 4001 and different values
of m in the range from 2 to 14. We simulated 100 independent runs of 100000
time steps each. We average the mean value of σ2/N using the last 50000 steps
for each run. The figure inset reports the same values corresponding to m = 2
with error bars (∆x1, ∆x2 and ∆x3, respectively). The bars overlap for this value
of m. We performed a χ2 statistical test on means in order to check the null hy-
pothesis H0: “the three values are mutually consistent within these error bars,
i.e., the obtained values of x1, x2 and x3 correspond to measurements of variables
with the same mean value, and normal distribution” [20]. We computed the sta-
tistical value S as the weighted sum of the squared deviations from the weighted
average value of the three measurements (x), i.e., S =
∑3
i=1 (xi − x)2/∆x2i where
xi and ∆xi are the variable and error corresponding to the i-th model and x is
the maximum likelihood estimator of the mean of the three values. For m = 2,
we obtained S = 1.30 and for this reason H0 cannot be rejected, even when
p(no|µp ≡ e)MGper clearly differs from p(no|µp ≡ e)MG and p(no|µp ≡ e)MGrand .
If we perform the test only for the couple MG and MGrand, we cannot reject
H0 (in this case H0: “the two values are mutually consistent”) for m = 3, but
we can reject it for m = 4, . . . , 9 with significance level smaller than 0.5%. For
m = 3 and the three models we obtain S = 20.54 and, in this case, we reject H0
with less than 0.5% of significance level, concluding that results from MGper are
different from MG and MGrand in games with m = 3 with a 0.5% probability of
error of the second kind.
when agents are processing a state in an even appearance. Furthermore, from these expressions,
one can easily check that the SPTD is still verified in this new game. Therefore, proceeding
as before we can use (23) in order to get analytical approximations for σ2/N . In Figure 7 we
compare our analytical calculations with numerical simulations of the MGrand in which any
agent chooses to assign, with probability 1/2, uo virtual points (instead of zero) with uo = 2 and
uo = 4 to their strategies. The calculations were carried out by using (27), as the conditional
probabilities p(no|µp ≡ e). Comparing
NE
do˜
−NE
d∼o˜
NE
with the unbiased
Ndo˜−Nd∼o˜
N
, it is easy to prove
that the bias implies a mitigation of the crowd effect, a fact that becomes apparent in Figure 7.
In order to find expressions for similar games with p = a/b (a rational number with a, b integer
and positive numbers with b ≥ a) then one needs to use an extended set of strategies in the
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Figure 7. Left: σ2/N as a function of α. Numerical simulations of the unbiased
MGrand (full line), and biased MGRAND with uo = 2 (dashed line). Our analyt-
ical calculation is displayed in full circles. Right: the same as left with uo = 4.
In all the cases, N = 1001, and for each value of N and m we performed 100
runs, each one of T = 100000 time steps discarding the first 50000 steps.
following way: take b−a copies of the set SL and keep the strategies in zero virtual points, then
take a copies of the set SL and assign uo virtual points to their strategies. Consider the enlarged
FSMGE by taking a single copy of any possible agent with strategies taken from copies of SL.
Now, the pb-biased MG can be understood as a sample of this game, and the calculations can
be repeated step by step. Moreover, different uo can be introduced in the same game by adding
more copies of SL.
Since the influence of initial biased scores of the type described in this section does not seem
to be too well documented in the existing literature, we illustrate the behaviour of the biased
game by means of several numerical simulations given in Section 4.
3.4. Range of validity of PTD. If o˜ was the outcome in the last odd occurrence of some state
µ, then for the next (hence even) appearance of µ, equation (15) shows that the FSMG verifies
the SPTD. Since the MG can be regarded as a statistical sample of the FSMG, this brings a
natural way to approximate the probability of breaking the PTD for the first time in the MG.
Indeed, if we denote with PPTD the probability of verifying the PTD for some configuration E
of the MG we clearly have
PPTD = P (No˜ > N/2).
On the other hand, from (19) we see that PPTD can be easily calculated. In fact, by using the
normal distribution approximation to the binomial (19) we get
PPTD ∼ 1− Φ
(
−
√
N(p1 − p2)√
1− (p1 − p2)2
)
, (35)
where Φ stands for the cumulative function of the standard normal distribution. Probabilities
pi can now be calculated by means of (18) and using (13). Since (13) depends on no, the values
of p(no|µp ≡ e) are needed in order to find p1 − p2. For the MG these values were obtained in
Subsection 3.2 by means of the de Bruijin graph, but since we do not have an analytic expression
for them, we may use the values (27) for the MGrand as an approximation. Moreover, a further
approximation can be made, as it was mentioned before in the MGrand approximately half of
states will be in odd occurrences, and therefore we can take no = H/2 as a “typical” value (in
fact the inset of Figure 8 shows the analytical results for both approaches and there are not any
noticeable differences).
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Taking a rough approximation by using only the typical no = H/2 we arrive to the compact
expression
PPTD ∼ 1− Φ


−√N 1
2H(1+ 1
2H
)
(
H
H/2
)
√
1−
(
1
2H(1+ 1
2H
)
(
H
H/2
))2


and using that 1 + 1
2H
∼ 1 and 1
2H
(
H
H/2
) ∼√ 2Hpi we get
PPTD ∼ 1− Φ
(
−
√
N
Hpi
2 − 1
)
. (36)
It is important to note that our arguments are developed under the assumption of SPTD. Once
the period two dynamics is broken, the system falls into states whose values of p1 and p2 can
not be calculated by means of this approach. This means that Eq. (36) is a good approximation
for the probability of breaking PTD for the first time in a given realization of the MG. Despite
the involved approximations, and as it is shown in Figure 8, theoretical results are in very good
agreement with numerically computed values of PPTD for the MG.
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Figure 8. Probability PPTD for PTD to take place in even occurrences of the
states as a function of α, calculated as one minus the probability of breaking the
PTD for the first time in a given simulation of the game. The full line is the
analytic case (by using the approximation no = H/2). Empty circles: results of
the simulation of theMG. In the simulations we have computed PPTD as follows:
at each even occurrence of each state, if after the poll the PTD is not fulfilled (i.e.,
the minority side agrees with that obtained after the previous –odd– occurrence
of the same state), then we consider that this step does not contribute to PPTD.
At the same time, present state and virtual points are assigned as if the PTD
had not failed. This way we compute the probability of breaking the PTD for
the first time in the game. The empty circles show the average of 100 runs of
100000 steps each, for N = 501, 531, 561, 591, 621, 651, 681, 711, 741, 771 and
m = 2, . . . , 7. Inset: comparison between the expression (36) (the full line) and
the analogous obtained by using the complete distribution of p(no|µp ≡ e) given
by (27) (full circles). Both curves are indistinguishable.
4. Numerical simulations for the biased MG
In this section we present numerical results addressing the behaviour of the biasedMG studied
in Subsection 3.3. We first plot σ2/N vs. α for different values of initial scores, always for p = 1/2
as the probability of assigning the initial scores to the strategies. The main plot in Figure 9
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shows these results for uo = 2, 6, 10. Initial scores decrease the waste of resources only during the
crowd dynamics. In the inset of the same figure, we present detailed results for uo = 4, 6, 8, 10,
zooming on the range at which these curves change their curvature. Let us mention that, from
equation (34), it is easy to see that for values of uo greater than no − 1, the expression for
NEdo˜ − NEd∼o˜ becomes independent of uo (indeed we get NEdo˜ − NEd∼o˜ = L2/22no2
(2no−1
no−1
)
). In
particular, taking the “typical” no = H/2 for the MGrand, we see that if uo & H/2− 1, then a
curve of σ2/N vs. α for a given value of uo, overlaps with any other curve given by a greater
values of uo in the region of m . 1+ log2(uo+1) (see Figure 9, e.g., if uo = 6 then the condition
is met for m . 3.8).
Figure 10 a) and Figure 10 b) show σ2/N and the probability PPTD, respectively, vs. the
initial scores for several values of α. In all cases, N = 1001 is considered. Let us notice that
PTD is valid in the biased model for m = 2 (α ∼ 0.004) in all the range of initial biased values.
If m = 5 (α ∼ 0.032) then PTD is broken for uo = 6, if m = 6 (α ∼ 0.064) then PTD is broken
for uo = 3, and if m = 7 (α ∼ 0.128) or m = 8 (α ∼ 0.256) then PTD is broken for all values of
biased scores starting from uo = 1, as in the case of unbiased MG (although for m = 7, PPTD
is very close to 1 when uo = 1).
It is worth to remark that since the maximum of 2pb(1− pb) is reached for pb = 1/2 (in fact,
this is the case in our simulations), we see that at most half of the agents (in average) are allowed
to have different initial point scores for their strategies. Remarkably, as it is easily deduced from
our calculations the reduced variance σ2/N behaves as α−1, as uo → ∞. To be more precise,
for each α & 0 it is enough to take uo & Nα = H in order to obtain an analogous of equation
(29), that reads:
σ2/N ∼ 1/4 + 1
16
N
piH , (37)
in contrast with the case of uniform bias [9, 12], for which σ2/N ∼ α when uo →∞.
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Figure 9. σ2/N as a function of α. Numerical simulations of the unbiased MG
(dash line), and biased MG with uo = 2 (filled circles), uo = 6 (filled squares),
and uo = 10 (filled triangle). The inset shows results for values of uo = 4, 6, 8, 10,
using empty squares for uo = 4, empty triangles for uo = 8, and the same symbols
as in the main figure for the other cases. Curves in the inset are zooming in
the range at which these curves change their curvature. Let us mention that
curves overlap for values of m . 1 + log2(uo + 1), as can be predicted from our
calculations. In all the simulations, N = 1001. We performed 50 runs, each one
of T = 100000 time steps discarding the first 50000 steps for cases uo = 0, 2, 4, 6,
and T = 50000 time steps discarding the first 10000 steps for the cases uo = 8, 10.
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Figure 10. Left: a) σ2/N vs. initial scores at a fixed value of α (we take
N = 1001, andm = 2 · · · 8), with filled circles (m = 2), diamonds (m = 3), empty
squares (m = 4), X symbols (m = 5), filled squares (m = 6), filled triangles
(m = 7) and empty triangles (m = 8). Right: b) PPTD in even occurrences of
the states as a function of initial scores at a fixed value of α. In the simulations
we have computed PPTD as we did in Figure 8 for the cases N = 1001 and
m = 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Symbols are the same as in figure a). In both figures, we
performed 50 runs, each one of T = 100000 time steps discarding the first 50000
steps for cases uo = 0, 2, 4, 6, and T = 50000 time steps discarding the first 10000
steps for the cases uo = 1, 3, 5, 7, 8.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we showed that the FSMG can be useful to understand certain features of the
MG in the symmetric phase. The FSMG is a maximal instance of the MG, where a single
copy of every potential agent takes part of the game. Due to this fact, several symmetries can
be exploited, allowing us to obtain analytical solutions for the FSMG. These theoretical results
were used to compute approximated values of the key variable σ2/N for the standard MG, as
well as for other versions based on different updating rules that can be found in the literature.
It is also shown that our technique allows to handle certain cases of strategies with biased initial
scores. We were able to show that the FSMG enjoys the strict period two dynamics, a fact
that led us to a simple way of computing the probability of breaking the period two dynamics
for the first time in a given realization of the MG. We are convinced that the FSMG and the
framework presented can be useful, in the symmetric phase, for other variants of the MG.
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